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ABSTRACT 
Are the largest global banks now safer in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis? 
FRFXVLQJRQDµEHIRUH¶DQGµDIWHU¶EDODQFHVKHHWDQDO\VLVRIWZHQW\±one 
of the largest American, British and European banks, we assess post±crisis banking 
performance. Much of the literature focuses on post±crisis regulation, but we argue 
instead that the main driver of change since the crisis has been structural conditions in 
banking and financial markets, particularly high levels of competition, bleak profit and 
share price conditions, and the largely unsolved too big to fail problem. Older as well 
as new forms of systemic risk thus prevail and many of the global banks still face major 
vulnerabilities. 
 
KEYWORDS Financial crisis, financial markets, banking reform, institutionalism, regulation, banking 
performance. 
 
 
Introduction 
A key question since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is whether the major global banks that were 
key actors in the crisis have now changed and become stronger and safer?  
 In answering this question, the responses by governments, officials and academics have varied. 
President Obama (2016) suggested that regulatory reforms had made the US ILQDQFLDOV\VWHPµVDIHUDQG 
PRUH UHVLOLHQW¶7KH3UHVLGHQWRI WKH(XURSHDQ&HQWUDO%DQN0DULR'UDJKL DKDVFHOHEUDWHG
µVXEVWDQWLDO¶UHJXODWRU\UHIRUPVFormer US Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner (2017: 54) thinks 
the UHIRUPVµKDYHDGGHGDFRQVLGHUDEOHPDUJLQRIVDIHW\WR WKH86ILQDQFLDOV\VWHP¶Former British 
Chancellor, George Osborne (2015), has FODLPHG µHQRUPRXV SURJUHVV¶ LQ UHVROYLQJ Whe µ%ULWLVK
GLOHPPD¶of maintaining London as a global financial centre without exposing taxpayers to calamitous 
costs. The IMF (2017: ix) argues that µEanks in advanced economies have become safer in recent years, 
ZLWK VWURQJHU FDSLWDO DQG OLTXLGLW\ EXIIHUV¶ In contrast, academic assessments of the post±crisis 
environment tend to be less sanguine. Thomas Rixen (2013) thinks post±crisis regulation has been 
feeble. Eric Helleiner (2014: 11) describes a Status Quo Crisis in which µWKHPDUNHW±friendly nature of 
pre±crisis international financial standards [has] not been overturned in DVLJQLILFDQWZD\¶ Similarly, 
Barry Eichengreen (2015) has unfavourably contrasted the ambition and effectiveness of the post±1930s 
reform agenda with current reforms.  
 These views all have one thing in common; they focus almost exclusively on regulation and far 
less on the actual behaviour or performance of banks. One way of approaching our central question 
would be to focus directly on the performance of banks and on the agency and behaviour of bankers 
since the 2008 crisis. The basic institutional insight here is that the agency and behaviour of bankers is 
conditioned by how they appraise and navigate the constraints and opportunities they confront. Even 
within the same national markets and institutional arrangements, however, Bell and Hindmoor (2015) 
have highlighted and explained the variability of banking behaviour prior to the crisis. Such variability 
is also apparent after it. Indeed, as this paper shows through detailed balance sheet analysis of a sample 
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of major global banks, some banks have fared reasonably well since the crisis, whilst others are 
performing far worse on a range of key measures, with many looking decidedly weak and unstable. 
This variability in performance, even within the same national markets, is interesting both empirically 
and theoretically and potentially has important lessons regarding regulation, banking practice and 
banker agency, and is well worth exploring in these terms.  
We have decided however to take a somewhat different or at least more expansive approach. 
We argue that the regulatory reforms that have been the central concern of policy makers and analysts 
since the crisis have mainly and somewhat narrowly focussed on specific institutional attributes of 
banks, especially on regulations designed to strengthen bank balance sheets through measures to 
increase bank capital and liquidity. On the other hand, there has been far less focus on the broader 
structural context, especially the markets and market conditions in which banks operate. These latter 
structural/market conditions, we argue, have been more important than extant regulations in shaping 
bank performance, both before and since the crisis. The narrow regulatory focus compared to a broader 
structural focus stands in contrast to what happened during the banking reforms in the 1930s in the US, 
for example, when structural elements such as banking markets were a major reform focus and were 
fundamentally restructured. This omission is important because the current regulatory and institutional 
focus on repairing bank balance sheets misses key structural forces in banking markets that continue to 
leave most of the largest banks collectively less safe.  
In the first part of this paper, we assess the current regulatory focus on bank balance sheets and 
review how banks have responded by examining the balance sheets of twenty±one of the largest 
American, British and European banks designated by the Financial Stability Board (2016) as being 
global systemically important.1 We compare balance sheets at two points in time: in 2005, at the height 
of the financial boom, and in 2015. While there is no straightforward link between bank balance sheets 
DQGILQDQFLDOVWDELOLW\ZHDUJXHWKDWWKLVNLQGRIµEHIRUH¶DQGµDIWHU¶DQDO\VLVFDQWHOOXVDJUHDWGHDO
about how the banks have or have not changed. In this part of the paper, we thus assess how banks have 
responded to regulation, mainly using metrics related to bank capital and liquidity.  
We then argue that a regulatory focus on bank balance sheets has several significant limitations 
as a guide to banking behaviour and safety. First, and as others have argued, exant regulations are overly 
complex and face the ongoing threat of being gamed, reversed or watered±down (Bell and Hindmoor 
2015; Mirowski 2013; Wolf 2014; Johal, Moran and Williams 2014; Moschella and Tsingou 2013; 
Young and Park 2013; Mügge 2014; Tsingou 2014). Second, and as noted, the focus on how banks 
have responded to regulation misses the impacts of the wider structural and market contexts in which 
                                                          
1
 These banks are: Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase, Morgan Stanley, 
Wells Fargo and State Street (all banks with headquarters in the US), Barclays, HSBC, the Royal Bank 
of Scotland (RBS) and Standard Chartered (all banks with headquarters in the UK), Credit Suisse and 
UBS (Switzerland), Deutsche Bank (Germany), ING Bank (Netherlands) Unicredit Group (Italy), 
Santander (Spain), Nordea (Sweden) and Société Générale, Crédit Agricole and BNP Paribas (France). 
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banks operate. These later conditions are important, and, as we show, can undermine apparent progress 
on the regulatory front.  
We then explore banking in a broader structural/market context. We emphasise four prominent 
factors that have played an important role in driving vulnerabilities and risk within banking: strong and 
continuing competitive pressures on banks for high returns in financialised banking markets; the growth 
of shadow banking, weak post±crisis banking profits and bank equity values; and the continuing huge 
scale and interconnectedness of the largest banks and financial institutions.  
In terms of performance, there are some bright spots. Although there is a degree of inter±bank 
variation, bank capital and liquidity levels appear, overall, to be higher than they were in 2005, whilst 
dependence upon volatile wholesale funding has fallen. Furthermore, a number of the largest banks 
have also wound±back their investment banking activities and reduced their dependence upon non±
interest sources of income. This is, in terms of financial stability, a positive story. The problem is that 
important underlying structural conditions in banking markets have not changed, particularly high 
levels of competition, the growing presence of off±balance sheet shadow banking activities, and the too 
big to fail problem. Moreover, a key change that has occurred since 2008 is that banks are now facing 
weak markets and bleak profit and share price conditions, rendering many banks vulnerable. Older as 
well as new forms of systemic risk thus prevail and many of the global banks we focus on, especially 
many of those located within the Eurozone, still face major vulnerabilities.  
The implication of our analysis implies the need for states to more actively shape banking 
markets and not just bank balance sheets. Yet we argue that the agency of political leaders and regulators 
is constrained, and on this note, we explain why governments and regulators have tended to focus on 
narrower institutional facets of banking and appear reluctant to alter fundamental market structures.  
 
Methods and Approach 
Bank balance sheets comprised of detailed and audited information about assets, liabilities and sources 
of revenue, can tell us a great deal about what banks are doing and the risks they are carrying. In what 
follows we use balance sheet information collated and published by Bankscope to conduct a 
comparative balance sheet analysis.2 To make our empirical task more manageable, we analyse the 
balance sheets of twenty±one American, British and European systemically important banks at the 
height of the economic and financial boom in 2005 and then, ten years later, in 2015. Because the 
banking sector has consolidated since the banking crisis, many of these banks, we might add, have 
become more not less important in the post±crisis era 
                                                          
2
 Bankscope is published by Bureau van Dijk. All the data cited here was last accessed in December 
2016. In January 2017 Bureau van Dijk withdrew Bankscope replacing it with a new service: Orbis 
Bank Focus. Unfortunately, this new service only reports on bank data since 2011. See 
http://www.bvdinfo.com/en-gb/our-products/company-information/international-products/bankscope.  
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 Our study has limitations however: we do not study all banks or study dynamics in any great 
detail within the shadow banking sector. Moreover, RXU µVQDSVKRW¶DQDO\VLV WDNHVQRDFFRXQWRI WKH
ways in which balance sheets change on a year±by±year basis. Our findings are also provisional 
because, even in 2015, memories of the 2008 crisis remained strong. An important future test of 
financial stability will inevitably come during the next financial boom when those who experienced the 
20008 crisis may have departed, and analysts are, once more, convinced that µWKLV WLPH LVGLIIHUHQW¶
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009).  
 
Banking in a Regulatory Context 
Public anger about the banking crisis, and subsequent bail±outs and banking scandals, has opened±up 
WKH SUHYLRXVO\ µTXLHW¶ &XOSHSSHU  ZRUOG RI EDQNLQJ DQG EDQN UHJXODWLRQ WR H[WHQVLYH SXEOLF
scrutiny and extensive regulatory reform. Central bankers and regulators now routinely question the 
efficiency of markets and the capacity of banks. The Chairman of the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) 
(2015: 1) has stated that µWKHJOREDO regulatory and supervisory environment for banks has changed 
beyond all UHFRJQLWLRQ¶ Reforms have been particularly focussed on bank balance sheets, however, 
especially on bank capital and liquidity, and also on efforts to better control financial trading, and on 
resolution regimes. New macroprudential regulation has also been introduced, premised upon a 
recognition of the possibility of irrational exuberance, asset bubbles, systemic risk, and poorly aligned 
incentive structures (Bell and Hindmoor 2014b; Baker 2013; Tucker, Hall and Pattani 2013; Barwell 
2013). In this section, we review the main institutional reforms and their balance sheet outcomes, 
especially in relation to capital and liquidity. We then review ongoing limitations and vulnerabilities 
regarding regulation.  
 
Capital 
%DQNFDSLWDOLVVKDUHKROGHUV¶HTXLW\DEDQNV¶RZQUHVHUYHVDQGUHWDLQHGHDUQLQJV. Capital is important 
because banks with higher capital buffers (that is a higher ratio of capital to assets) are more likely to 
be able to withstand significant losses whilst remaining solvent (Bell and Hindmoor 2017). In the 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis, thin capital buffers came to be seen as a key source of financial fragility, 
with the then US Treasury Secretary, Tim Geithner, suggesting WKDWWKHµWRSWKUHHWKLQJVWRJHWGRQH>LQ
UHIRUPLQJWKHILQDQFLDOV\VWHP@DUHµFDSLWDOFDSLWDODQGFDSLWDO¶/HRQKDUGWDOVRVHH)LQDQFLDO
Stability Forum 2008: 12; Turner 2009: 7).  
 Since 2009, new regulations relating to the size of minimal capital buffers, countercyclical 
capital buffers, the stress testing of capital adequacy, and, in the US, additional capital requirements for 
overseas±based banks, have been introduced (see Vives 2016: 58±62 for a review). Critics such as Anit 
Admati (2015) and the former chair of the 8.¶VIndependent Commission on Banking, Sir John Vickers 
(2016), have argued that post±crisis capital buffers remain inadequate and have not risen nearly far 
enough. The Bank of England (Arnold 2016), The European Central Bank (Draghi 2016b) and the 
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Federal Reserve (Rosengren 2013) argue not only that capital buffers are much higher than they were 
in 2007/8, but that they are now high enough to withstand the scale of losses experienced then. Geithner 
(2017: 59) argues that in the US capital levels are now much higher, WKHµTXDOLW\RIWKHFDSLWDOEDQN¶V
KROG«KDVLPSURYHGJUHDWO\¶, and the regulatory net regarding capital is now much wider.  
 We rely upon a measure of absolute leverage, that is the ratio of total assets to total equity, as 
our measure of bank capital. This is a better measure than the ratio of risk±weighted assets to equity, 
which can often be poorly calibrated (Haldane and Madouros 2012). Figure 1 shows the level of 
absolute leverage at each bank in 2015 as a percentage of its leverage in 2005. What this shows is that 
there is only one bank, ING Bank, at which overall leverage is now higher than it was in 2005. In several 
banks, leverage has fallen dramatically. At Morgan Stanley, leverage is 33% of its 2005 level. At UBS, 
it is 41% of its previous level; at Goldman Sachs 43% of its previous level; and at Barclays 45%. On 
average and across all twenty±one banks, leverage has fallen substantially and is only 69% of its 2005 
level.  
 
Figure 1 2015 Leverage as a % of 2005 Leverage. 
 
  
Figure 1 tells us about changes in leverage levels since 2005. Figure 2 shows absolute leverage ratios 
in 2015. The average leverage ratio was 15.2 of assets to 1 of equity, with a range running from just 
under 8: 1 (Citigroup) to 24: 1 (Deutsche Bank). In comparing the results of Figures 1 and 2, we note 
that several banks which have, since 2005, reduced their leverage by the least amount, including HSBC, 
Wells Fargo and JP Morgan, nevertheless still have amongst the lowest absolute overall leverage ratios. 
These banks maintained relatively low levels of leverage in 2005 and have not had to reengineer their 
balance sheets to the same extent most other banks have. Conversely, and despite reducing its leverage 
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to just 50% of its 2005 level, Deutsche Bank still has the highest absolute leverage ratio: a fact which 
goes some way toward explaining its recent share price travails. A second point to make is that there is 
a clear geographic basis to the differences in absolute leverage. The American banks have the lowest 
leverage (an average of 9.5: 1), the Eurozone banks the highest (an average of 19.5: 1) with the UK 
banks somewhere in between (an average of 14.4: 1). This, in part, reflects enduring national±level 
differences in regulation. In Europe, lobbying by the French and German governments resulted in a 
significant dilution of the Basel III capital rules and the introduction not only of minimum but of 
maximum capital buffers (Bell and Hindmoor 2016). The difference this has made to absolute leverage 
levels is clearly apparent in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 Leverage in 2015 (ratio of total assets to total equity). 
 
 
Liquidity 
Structurally, banks have always faced a maturity mismatch on their balance sheets; lending long, but 
borrowing short. This can create funding and liquidly pressures, especially during a bank run. Prior to 
the 1980s, a central focus of bank regulators was on ensuring adequate levels of liquidity ± a measure 
of the ability and ease with which assets can be converted to cash. In the decades prior to the crisis, 
UHJXODWRUV¶ LQWHUHVW LQ OLTXLGLW\ Zaned because bank executives and regulators assumed that 
securitisation and the development of wholesale funding markets meant banks would always be able to 
sell assets and raise additional funds at short notice (Goodhart 2011). 
 One of the important lessons of the 2008 crisis was that liquidity matters a great deal to bank 
solvency and overall financial stability. Following the failures of Northern Rock in August 2007, Bear 
Stearns in March 2008 and, of course, Lehman Brothers in September 2008, previously liquid asset and 
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funding markets froze, and banks found themselves unable to sell assets at any price or raise additional 
wholesale funding at any interest rate premium. The basic problem here was adverse selection. Banks 
could not sell their assets becauVHSRWHQWLDOEX\HUVIHDUHGWKH\PLJKWEHVROGWKHµWR[LF¶DVVHWV that banks 
were desperate to off±load. Nor could banks borrow money because potential lenders had no way of 
knowing which banks were teetering on the edge of insolvency. Lenders also had good reason to think 
that any bank which needed to borrow money urgently must be in a great deal of trouble and might not 
be able to repay it.  
 A key focus of post±crisis regulation has therefore been upon the development of two new 
funding rules to enhance liquidity (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: 2013). The first, the 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio, is designed to ensure that banks have enough liquid assets ± primarily cash 
and government securities ± that can, even in adverse market conditions, be easily sold. The second, 
the Net Stable Funding Ratio, requires banks to maintain a sustainable funding structure by placing a 
cap upon the amount they can borrow on wholesale funding markets relative to their level of deposits 
or equity. Amidst LQWHQVHOREE\LQJE\EDQNVDQGE\WKHEDQNHU¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOOREE\JURXSWKH,QVWLWXWH
of International Finance (2010), the argument was put that new liquidity rules would limit the capacity 
of banks to lend money and so prolong the post±crisis downturn. The implementation of these new rules 
has since been delayed.  
 In terms of the before and after comparison being conducted in this paper, the key question is 
therefore about the extent to which, in a post±crisis environment, bank executives ± perhaps under 
pressure from market analysts, shareholders and credit rating agencies ± have chosen to strengthen their 
liquidity. We focus here on exposure to wholesale funding for which it is possible to construct a detailed 
picture. Bankscope does not publish figures on wholesale borrowing on a bank±by±bank basis. What it 
is possible to instead do is to calculate the value of equity and deposits as a share of assets at each bank. 
This can serve as a proxy measure for the level of wholesale borrowing and thus exposure to wholesale 
funding markets. This is because bank balance sheet assets must match balance sheet liabilities, which, 
in turn, means that any shortfall in deposits and equity relative to assets must be compensated for 
through wholesale borrowing. Figure 3 shows the percentage point increase or decrease in the value of 
equity and deposits relative to assets across nineteen banks between 2005 and 2015 (Goldman Sachs 
and Morgan Stanley are excluded here because although they converted to bank holding status in 2008, 
they essentially remain investment banks with very low deposit bases). ING Bank, BNP Paribas, State 
Street, Citigroup and Credit Suisse have increased their equity and deposit base relative to the size of 
their assets by more than 15 percentage points. On the other end of this scale, Standard Chartered, Bank 
of America, Société Générale and RBS have not significantly reduced their dependence upon wholesale 
funding, whilst the Danish bank Nordea has significantly increased it. Overall, there has been a tangible 
improvement, with, on average, a 9±percentage point increase in deposits and equity as a share of assets. 
This finding supports recent analysis by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) on EDQNV¶UHGXFHG
exposure to wholesale funding (BIS, 2016: 103; BIS, 2017, 84).  
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Figure 3 Percentage point increases/decreases in Equity and Deposits as a % of Assets, 2005±2015. 
 
 
Extending this analysis, figure 4 shows absolute levels of total equity and deposits as a share of 
total assets at the same set of banks in 2015. Once again, what is immediately apparent here is the 
significant level of variation across the banks. At State Street, Wells Fargo, Bank of America, ING 
Bank, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Standard Chartered and HSBC, equity and deposits amount to more 
than 60% of the value of total assets. On the other hand, in the European banks ± BNP Paribas, Deutsche, 
Nordea and Société Générale±equity and deposits account for less than 40% of assets. There is, once 
again, an obvious geographic and regulatory basis to these differences. In the American banks, equity 
and deposits are on average 72% of assets. In the British banks, they are 54% of assets and in the 
Eurozone banks just 43% of assets. 
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Figure 4 Total Equity and Deposits as a % of Total Assets in 2015. 
 
 
 Judged in terms of their capital and liquidity positions, our overall assessment here is that whilst 
there is a great deal of bank±level variation, the balance sheets of the largest banks have, overall, 
become somewhat safer. But there are important political and institutional caveats to add to this 
conclusion even before we come to discuss broader market and structural conditions.  
Despite hard±won gains, studies have shown how regulatory reform efforts across a range of 
issues have frequently been stymied by successful lobbying by the banks (Pagliari and Young 2014); 
by the desire of politicians to protect their own national banks and financial trading centres (Howarth 
and Quaglia 2013); by gaming and regulatory arbitrage (Bell and Hindmoor 2014a); and by a neoliberal 
backlash which maintains that the financial crisis was caused not by too little but by too much 
government regulation (Wallison and Burns 2011). Efforts to roll back banking regulation in the US by 
President Trump reflect such pressures and values.  
 Institutionally, bank regulators also face problems. Former Bank of England Governor, Mervyn 
King (2009), KDVZDUQHGDERXWWKHµVKHHUFUHDWLYHLPDJLQDWLRQRIWKHILQDQFLDOVHFWRULQGUHDPLQJXS
QHZZD\VRIWDNLQJULVNV¶: OHDGLQJKLPWRFRQFOXGHWKDWµWKHEHOLHIWKDWDSSURSULDWHUHJXODWLRQFDQHQVXUH
WKDWVSHFXODWLYHDFWLYLWLHVGRQRWUHVXOWLQIDLOXUHVLVDGHOXVLRQ¶The danger here is that regulators and 
supervisors, given the approach they have adopted, are being forced into an endless game of catch±up, 
attempting to keep abreast of growing complexity and the evolving minutiae and innovations in the 
financial world. The President and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Richard Fisher (2013), 
DUJXHVWKDWµUHJXODWRry supervision, by definition, is always at least one step behind the actions taken 
by market participants. The more complex the rules, the more difficult it is to bridge the gap due to the 
complexities of financial markets¶. This is significant because, in relation to capital, liquidity and 
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financial trading, regulations have become more complex. For example, the Basel I standards ran to 30 
pages, whilst Basel III runs to over 600 pages of rules. The Dodd±Frank Act in the US is 2,330 pages 
long, with over 22,000 pages of detailed regulations currently issued and with more coming. Banks and 
financial institutions have also been able to outspend the regulators in political and court battles and 
have often poached key regulators. ,QVXFKFLUFXPVWDQFHVDV*HLWKQHUDUJXHVµUHJXODWLRQ
FDQDGDSWEXWLWZLOODOZD\VEHEHKLQGWKHFXUYH¶And as .HQQHWK5RJRIIDUJXHVµDVILQDQFH
has become more complicated, regulators have tried to keep up by adopting ever more complicated 
UXOHV,W¶VDQDUPVUDFHWKDWXQGHUIXQGHGUHJXODWRU\DJHQFLHVKDYHQRFKDQFHRIZLQQLQJ¶According to 
The Economist DEDQNHUFORVHWRWKHDFWLRQLQWKH86KDVSUHGLFWHGµDGHFDGHRIJULQGZLWK
constant disputes in courts and legislatures, finally producing a regime riddled with exemptions and 
QXDQFHVWKDWPD\EHFDXVHRILWVFRPSOH[LW\H[DFHUEDWHV\VWHPLFULVNVUDWKHUWKDQPLWLJDWHWKHP¶ 
 The current reliance on balance sheet regulation thus faces significant political and institutional 
headwinds. But more importantly, there are key sources of banking risk that stem from broader 
structural forces in banking and financial markets. Compared to balance sheet issues and the regulatory 
focus on bank capital and liquidity, these structural factors have not been a key focus of debate or 
regulation. 
 
Banking in a Market Context 
There were major structural changes in banking markets in the core crisis±hit economies in the run±up 
to the 2008 crisis. Structural factors here are understood essentially as material force, and incentives 
emanating from markets and primarily include the changing nature of banking markets as well as bank 
exposure to the pressures from equity markets. Structures have institution±like effects in the way they 
shape the incentives and options available to agents. Structural effects will also typically be mediated 
by agency and institutions and hence, from the perspective of given agents such as bankers, the impact 
and indeed the meaning of structural forces will be partly shaped by the institution in which they are 
located.  
 The standard structural predicament faced by banks which makes them inherently unstable is 
that they are subject to panics DQGUXQVODUJHO\EHFDXVHWKH\FRQIURQWDµPDWXULW\PLVPDWFK¶ based on 
lending long but borrowing short. In recent decades there have been further structural changes to 
banking markets that have increased vulnerability. Hardie et al. (2013) have pointed to an uneven 
pattern of convergence in banking systems across G7 countries prior to the crisis, towards a system of 
µPDUNHW±EDVHGEDQNLQJ¶ featuring, in particular, originate and distribute mortgage trading and highly 
leveraged financial trading. This marked DVKLIWDZD\ IURPµWUDGLWLRQDOEDQNLQJ¶ZKHUHFRPPHrcial 
banks focussed on loans retained on their balance sheets. This shift has also placed pressure on 
coordinated, bank±EDVHGV\VWHPVVXFKDVLQ*HUPDQ\ZKHUHEDQNVµDUHXQDEOHWRSHUIRUPWKHUROHRI
bulwarks against market pressures that is assigned to them by the concept of a bank±EDVHGV\VWHP¶
(Hardie e al. 2013: 708).  
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 Whilst useful, the analysis by Hardie et al. is largely focussed on pre±crisis developments. It is 
also too generalised to discriminate between quite different banking markets across a number of 
advanced economies, all of which are broadly µmarket±based¶ but which behave differently. For 
example, amidst the 2008 crisis, many banks in the financial heartlands of the US and UK (as well as 
some major European banks that traded in the London and New York markets) imploded, whilst banks 
in countries such as Australia and Canada largely avoided the risky highly±leveraged trading at the 
centre of the crisis (Bell and Hindmoor 2015). 
 
Market Competition and Tough Conditions 
Bell and Hindmoor (2015) argue that the crucial structural difference across such markets centres on 
the level of competition; particularly equity market pressures for high returns and similarly derived 
pressures from hostile takeovers; all of which is assRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH JURZLQJ µILQDQFLDOLVDWLRQ¶ RI
markets (Zwan 2014). The banks that imploded in 2008 were generally OHGE\EDQNHUVZKRZHUHµWUXH
EHOLHYHUV¶ LQ WKH QHZ banking markets (Bell 2017). But, more fundamentally, it was the intense 
competitive pressures in core crisis±hit banking markets that generated strong incentives to record, on 
a quarterly basis, sector±beating profits and returns±on±equity (Bell and Hindmoor 2015).3 By contrast, 
Australia and Canada have more regulated and structured markets that prevent the take±over of the 
major banks, thus reducing competitive pressure to well below that found in the crisis±hit markets where 
hostile takeovers and equity market pressures acted as a stern discipline on banks. As Gowan (2009: 9) 
arguesµHQVXULQJWKHVDIHW\RIWKHV\VWHPUHTXLUHVWKDWFRPSHWLWLRQEHWZHHQEDQNVEHVXSSUHVVHG¶<HW
official opinion and policies after 2008 still endorse market competition in banking as an efficiency 
stimulus. As Goodhart argues: 
How much competition within our banking systems do we actually want? Remember that 
the measures taken after the Great Depression in the United States were primarily and 
intentionally anti±FRPSHWLWLYH« RQH RI WKH UHDVRQV ZK\ WKH $XVWUDOLDQ DQG &DQDGLDQ
EDQNLQJ V\VWHPV KDYH GRQH VR PXFK EHWWHU ZDV« LQ SDUW EHFDXVH WKH $XVWUDOLDQ DQG
Canadian banking systems (at least domestically) were in some part protected from 
competition ( RBA 2010). 
The former Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, Ian Macfarlane (2009: 42), argues that by 
reducing the threat of corporate take±over, $XVWUDOLD¶VVR±called four pillars banking policy reduced the 
pressure upon the largest banks to protect their share price and short±term profits by engaging in 
µH[FHVVLYHOHQGLQJDQGULVNWDNLQJ¶7KHSROLF\UHGXFHGFRPSHWLWLRQµWRDVXVWDLQDEOHOHYHODQGWKXV
SUHYHQWHGRXUEDQNVIURPPRYLQJWRRIDULQWKHULVN\GLUHFWLRQ«WKDWVDYHGXVIURPWKHZRUVWH[FHVVHV
that characterised bankiQJ V\VWHPV RYHUVHDV¶ $ Venior Australian banker DJUHHV µLQ D PDUNHW
                                                          
3
 There is a tangled literature on the relationship between market competition and stability with 
economists maintaining that increased competition is associated with financial stability and with 
financial instability (see Vives 2016 for a recent review). 
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY    13 
 
13 
 
dominated by the four major banks none of us had compelling incentives to go down the risk curve and 
JURZRXUERRNVDVPXFKPRUHFRQWHVWHGPDUNHWVKDYH¶TXRWHGLQBell and Hindmoor 2015: 263).  
 By contrast, in the crisis±hit markets, financial deregulation in the two decades prior to the 
crisis had increased competition and shaved lending margins, greatly increasing the pressure upon bank 
executives to secure alternative sources of profit. The rise of financialisation and share±holder power 
in equity markets and associated changes in corporate governance also occurred during this period and 
further increased profit pressures. Concurrent changes in executive compensation also worked in this 
direction, creating a de facto alliance between bank executives and share±holders for increases in share 
value and high short±term profits. The banks in the core markets generally responded robustly to these 
institutional pressures, producing ever±higher profits through financial innovation and securitisation, 
involving expanded, re±engineered and leveraged±up balance sheets. This shift, and a wave of M&A 
activity, also saw banks become too big to fail. Increasingly globalised links in securitisation and 
wholesale funding markets also meant that the largest banks became too interconnected to fail. The 
market environment as a structural context thus changed profoundly, strongly shaping banking 
behaviour, eventually leading to crisis. 
Some important structural characteristics in banking markets have not altered significantly 
since the crisis. This certainly applies to competitive pressures. True, partly because of bankruptcies, 
mergers, DQG D µIOLJKW WR VDIHW\¶ there has been growing market concentration in banking in some 
countries. Between 2005 and 2015, the value of the assets of the five largest banks in the UK as a share 
of total commercial banking assets increased from 69% to 71%, whilst in the US±traditionally a highly±
fragmented market ± it increased from 39% to 46% (in Germany it fell from 86% to 84%, in Switzerland 
from 92% to 89% and in France it remained at 73%) (World Bank 2017) (indicator GFDD.01.06). 
Nevertheless, in the post±crisis era, competitive pressures remain intense. In August 2016, the London±
EDVHGµURJXH¶WUDGHU.ZHNX$GREROLZKRKDGORVW8%6RYHUEQDUJXHGWKDWSRVW±crisis, financial 
WUDGHUVZRUNLQJZLWKLQWKHEDQNVVWLOOIDFHGWKHVDPHSUHVVXUHWRPDNHSURILWVµQRPDWWHUZKDW¶DQGWKDW
µLILnvestment banks continue to chase the same level of profitability as they have in the past, the only 
ZD\WRJHQHUDWHWKRVHSURILWVLVWRWDNHPRUHULVN¶&KDSPDQAt an executive level, the pressure 
to sustain high profits is well illustrated by the travails of Barclays. Having, in 2012, committed itself 
to significantly pruning its investment banking operations, Barclays then appeared to reverse course 
and terminated the contract of its new Chief Executive, Anthony Jenkins, in 2015, amidst reports that 
investors were concerned about falling profits and share dividends. A report in Business Insider UK 
noted, at the time, that:  
Barclays sacked CEO Antony Jenkins for effectively doing the job he was originally 
FDOOHGLQWRGR«ZKHQhe took the top job in 2012, Jenkins was charged with repairing 
WKH WDWWHUHG UHSXWDWLRQ RI WKH EDQN E\ WDFNOLQJ LWV µWR[LF FXOWXUH¶ GRZQVL]LQJ WKH
investment bank, and focusing more on retail operations. And he did just that ² except 
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maybe too quickly, and by too much. Crucially, he did it without boosting earnings at 
the same time (Brinded 2015). 
In a market environment which remains highly competitive, the problem the banks collectively 
face is that, post±crisis, profit opportunities have diminished. Martin Taylor (2016), an external member 
RIWKH%DQNRI(QJODQG¶V)LQDQFLDO3ROLF\&RPPLWWHHGHVFULEHVEDQNVDVQRZRSHUDWLQJLQDµWXQGUD±
OLNH¶HQYLURQPHQWLQZKLFKµLW¶VFROG«WKHODQGVFDSHLVYHU\IODWDQGWUHHVGRQRWHYHQSUHWHQGWRJURZ
WRWKHVN\¶By 2015, banks had already been hit by litigation costs exceeding $260bn (Noonan, 2015). 
Interest margins have also declined in an environment in which central bankers have held interest±rates 
at close to zero per cent. In 2005 the average interest±rate margin across our sample of 21 banks was a 
low 1.5% but by 2015 this had fallen to 1.46% (with the highest spreads of 2.9% at Wells Fargo and 
Citigroup and the lowest margins of 0.8% at Société Générale and Nordea). A further challenge has 
been the sluggish rate of economic growth in the core economies since 2009. In its 2016 Global 
Financial Stability Report, tKH,0)ZDUQVWKDWµFyclical pressures have hurt the outlook for 
bank earnings generation. Low inflation and low growth act to reduce loan demand and therefore the 
RXWORRNIRUIXWXUHEDQNHDUQLQJV¶$FURVVWKH2(&'*'3JURZWKDYHUDJHGIURPWR
but from 2008±2014 it averaged only 0.9%. This has put a damper on credit growth and lending. In the 
US and UK, credit growth averaged just over 3% between 2009 and 2016: compared with 8% between 
2001 and 2007. Within the Eurozone, credit growth was negative between 2012 and 2015 (Khan 2016). 
 
Bank Responses and Re±positioning 
How have the largest banks responded to the challenges of the new market environment in which they 
find themselves? 
In the post±crisis context, the IMF (2014a: 25) reports that many banks have reduced their 
global footprint and financial trading exposures and have placed a greater emphasis upon traditional 
commercial and mortgage lending in their domestic markets. Many banks are thus attempting to 
recolonize the traditional banking space. The problem, however, is that this has become a very crowded 
and low return space. Investment banks have also pulled back and refocused on more traditional wealth 
management and mergers and acquisitions activity. UBS (Sibun 2011), Credit Suisse (Treanor 2012), 
Deutsche (Reuters 2015), Citibank (Kapner 2012), RBS (McEwan 2014; Scuffham 2014), Citigroup 
(Kapner 2012) and Barclays (Economist 2009; Arnold 2015) have all announced plans to either 
significantly scale±back or eliminate their investment banking and financial trading activity. The former 
Chairman of the Royal Bank of Scotland, Sir Philip Hampton argues that, as a consequence, in the post±
crisis era, the largest global banks increasingly look and behave like traditional utility companies: 
operating under high levels of regulation with low returns on equity, a premium on safety, and 
constrained growth prospects (Jenkins 2016). 
In part, this change in strategy reflects the impact of reduced profit opportunities stemming 
from the flat markets and the continued reduced demand for asset securitisation. It also, however, 
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reflects the impact of regulatory changes. The so±called Volcker Rule, in the US, limits the capacity of 
the largest banks to engage in proprietary trading (Federal Reserve Bank 2013). The Securities and 
Exchange Commission (2014) has also approved risk±retention rules which require the sponsors of 
asset±backed securities to retain at least a 5% interest in the assets they sell. In the European Union, 
attention has mainly focussed on a Financial Transaction Tax (Brunsden, 2016). In the UK, the 
LQWURGXFWLRQRIDQLQWHUQDOµULQJ±IHQFH¶DLPV to shield retail banking from potentially riskier investment 
banking activities (Bell and Hindmoor 2014b). A report in the Wall Street Journal  notes thatµ7UDGLQJ
revenues globally have shrunk, [and] more stringent regulation has forced firms out of once±lucrative 
EXVLQHVVHV¶ (Hoffman 2016). Geithner (2017: 59) notes reductions in funding markets such as the Repo 
PDUNHW µ7KH VL]H RI WKH PDUNHW LV VPDOOHU WKH FROODWHUDO LV PXFK VDIHU DQG WKH DPRXQW ILQDQFHG
overnight is much smaller. Whole classes of risky funding vehicles were washed out in the crisis and 
have not remerged¶ 
 One indirect measure of the dependence of banks upon trading is the proportion of income 
derived from non±interest sources. Figure 5 shows the percentage point difference in the proportion of 
income derived from non±interest sources by the banks in our sample between 2005 and 2015, 
illustrating reduced reliance on such sources. On average, the share of income derived from non±interest 
sources fell by 7 percentage points from 58% to 51%. The largest falls in non±interest income were 
recorded at UBS (a 30±percentage point fall), ING (-26 points), Deutsche (-25 points), RBS (-22 points) 
and Credit Suisse (-18 points) On the other hand, some banks increased their relative dependence upon 
non-interest income: Bank of America (+25 percentage points), Standard Chartered (+12 points), 
Morgan Stanley (+ 5 points), Wells Fargo and Nordea (+ 4 points), Goldman Sachs (+ 3 points) and 
HSBC (+ 1 point).  
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Figure 5 Percentage Point Change in Income Derived from Non±Interest Sources, 2005±2015. 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the absolute proportions of income derived from non±interest sources for our 
sample of banks in 2015. UBS and RBS, which rushed headlong into trading in the 2000s, have 
significantly reduced their dependence upon non±interest income to 25% and 32% respectively. On the 
other hand, and despite converting to bank holding status in 2008, the former investment bank, Morgan 
Stanley, continues to derive most of its income from non±interest sources, though mainly now in 
advising and wealth management. It is also notable that Wells Fargo, Bank of American, Standard 
Chartered, and HSBC, all banks which entered the 2008 crisis with strong and relatively conservative 
balance sheets, have now not only expanded significantly in size but derive a larger proportion of their 
income from non±interest sources. In 2008 Bank of America, which had largely eschewed investment 
banking and financial trading during the boom years, acquired the investment bank Merrill Lynch. 
Wells Fargo, for its part, acquired Wachovia in 2008, which also had a significant trading desk. 
Executives at Wells Fargo initially said that they would wind±down this business and focus on 
:DFKRYLD¶VOHQGLQJERRN7KLVKDVQRW\HWKDSSHQHGEconomist 2016). 
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Figure 6 % of Income Derived from Non±Interest Sources, 2015. 
 
 
  
 Poor lending was a contributor to the 2008 crisis, so to what extent does this problem persist as 
banks attempt to re±position themselves? Reflecting more difficult credit conditions, the proportion of 
impaired loans in our sample has risen from an average of 1.53% in 2005 to 3.6% in 2015: though with 
considerable intra±bank variation. At UBS, Credit Suisse and Deutsche, banks which have wound±back 
their financial trading exposures, impaired loans constitute respectively, just 0.5%, 0.7% and 1.9% of 
all loans. These banks have not apparently sought to compensate for the loss of trading profits by 
rushing into high±ULVN OHQGLQJ DFWLYLW\ ,QGHHG D ODUJH SDUW RI WKH 'HXWVFKH¶V UHFHQW share price 
problems stems from the fact that its increasingly low±risk loan book does not generate sufficient profits 
(Oltermann and Treanor 2016). At the other end of the scale, at BNP Paribas and Société Générale, 
impaired loans account for, respectively, 5.9% and 6.1% of loans. At Unicredit, impaired loans now 
account for fully 16% of the value of all loans and 149% of total equity of the bank: a significant 
financial risk.4  
 The largest banks have, collectively, responded to changing market and regulatory conditions 
by reducing their investment banking activity and they have not, on the whole, so far at least, sought to 
compensate for this by engaging in high±risk lending activity. These are, in terms of financial stability, 
positive outcomes.  
 
                                                          
4
 Note that no data was available through Bankscope for the proportion of impaired loans at Unicredit 
Group in 2005 (or adjacent years). The figure of an average of 1.53% of impaired loans in 2005 is 
therefore exclusive of Unicredit. The 2015 figure of 3.6% is inclusive of Unicredit.  
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Retreating into the Shadows 
Yet, on the other side of the ledger, the sources of systemic risk are increasing in various ways. Flat 
markets, increased bank regulation, competition and the relentless search for yield, and financial 
innovation have encouraged a shift of activities into the less regulated shadow banking sector. For 
example, the (IMF 2014b: xUHSRUWVWKDWµ&DSLWDOPDUNHWVKDYHEHFRPHPRUHVLJQLILFDQWSURYLGHUVRI
credit since the crisis, shifting the locus of risks to the shadow banking system. The share of credit 
instruments held in mutual fund portfolios, for example, has been growing, doubling since 2007, and 
now amounts to 27% of global high±\LHOGGHEW¶ Structural developments in financial markets of this 
kind and strong links between the main banks and off±balance sheet shadow entities saw the 
crystallization of systemic risk in 2008. The panic induced by the failure of poorly managed banks like 
Bear Stearns (Cohan 2009), Lehman Brothers (McDonald 2009) and RBS (Fraser 2014) came close to 
destroying a series of other banks whose balance sheets, looked at in isolation, appeared much stronger. 
The fact remains that financial systems are often not much stronger than their weakest link and 
inevitably the main banks will remain exposed to risk in the shadow sector.  
 There have been some positive developments however. Securitisation markets that were at the 
centre of the 2008 crisis are now about a quarter of their size compared to pre±crisis levels (Financial 
Stability Board 2017: 2). Other activities in money market funds and repo markets have also declined 
somewhat since the crisis, non±bank financial entities reliant on short±term funding have declined, and 
bank reliance on shadow entities for wholesale funding has declined somewhat (Financial Stability 
Board 2017: 9, 13)$VWKH)6%FRPPHQWVµDVSHFWVRIWKHVKDGRZEDQNLQJDFWivities generally 
considered to have made the financial system most vulnerable and that contributed to the crisis have 
GHFOLQHGVLJQLILFDQWO\¶2QWKHRWKHUKDQGthe FSB (2017: 3) reports growth in collective investment 
vehicles ± fixed income funds, credit hedge funds and real estate funds ± WKDWIDFHµDUHODWLYHO\KLJK
GHJUHH RI FUHGLW ULVN¶ DQGDUH SRWHQWLDOO\ VXEMHFW WR UXQV There has also been the JURZWK RI µ',<¶
investment banking which is posing a competitive threat as asset management funds and hedge funds 
are increasingly running their own operations. These competitors often have lower overheads and are 
using in±house algorithmic trading programs to by±pass investment bank trading desks, which have 
been the locus of increased regulation since the crisis (Morel et al. 2016: 5±8; Economist 2013). On this 
note, *HLWKQHUDUJXHVWKDWµWKHVKULQNLQJPDUNHWVKDUHRIWKHEDQNVWKURXJKUHJXODWLRQFDQ
leavHWKHILQDQFLDOV\VWHPPRUHIUDJLOHLQWKHFDVHRIDQH[WUHPHHYHQW¶ 
 The growth in the shadow banking sector since the crisis, therefore, continues to pose systemic 
risks. The IMF (2014b: 67) argues that growing risks in the US shadow system, in particular, have seen 
ULVNV ULVH WR D SRLQW µslightly below pre±FULVLV OHYHOV¶ A Group of Thirty Report, chaired by Adair 
Turner, has recently argued that some of the older pre±crisis risks have modHUDWHGEXWWKDWµRYHUDOOWKH
risks from the combination of high leverage and the ways in which credit is intermediated may be as 
great now as they were before the 2007±FULVLV¶*URXSRI7KLUW\[LLA further problem is that 
these risks are not well understood given complexity, fast moving change and data limitations. The IMF 
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(2014: 73) notes that µin the advanced economies, shadow banking seems to be shifting to less well±
PRQLWRUHGDFWLYLWLHV¶7ellingly, the (IMF 2014b: 67) also admits that, µassessing risks associated with 
recent developments in shadow banking remains difficult, largely because of a lack of detailed data¶. 
The FSB (2017 29) concurs: µFRQWLQXHGGDWDJDSVDQGODFNRIULVNJUDQXODULW\KDPSHUVPRUHIRUZDUG±
looking identification of potential financial instability¶ Systemic risk stemming from the shadow sector 
thus remains and issue, and, as in the formal banking sector, regulators face an uphill battle in fully 
understanding financial risk in complex and rapidly evolving systems. 
 
Still too Big 
A further structural feature is the continuance of the µWRR±big±to±IDLO¶SUREOHP During the 1990s and 
2000s, some large banks trebled the value of their balance sheet assets. By 2007, the total assets of the 
US banking sector were the equivalent of around 110% of GDP, in Switzerland 160%, and in the UK 
over 500% of GDP (Haldane and Allesandri 2009). Many banks became both too large to fail, too large 
and complex to manage, and too interconnected, heightening systemic risk. Prior to the crisis, many 
executives were unable to effectively track and calibrate risk exposures on their balance sheets (Haldane 
2012; Bell and Hindmoor 2015), whilst the bankruptcy of any one major bank threatened the stability 
of the entire financial system.  
In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, some commentators called for the largest banks to be 
broken±up. European competition authorities have since required some banks which received state aid 
in 2008 to sell some of their subsidiaries or branches. In the US, the Dodd±Frank Act aims to limit the 
maximum deposit market share held by individual banks to 10%. The Financial Stability Board has 
imposed additional capital requirements upon systemically important banks. In the US, regulators run 
more extreme stress tests on banks with assets of over $250bn (McLannahan 2016). In the UK, the 
DVVHWVRI WKH ODUJHVW FRPPHUFLDOEDQNV DUHEHLQJ µULQJ±IHQFHG¶<HWSROLWLFLDQVDQG UHJXODWRUVKDYH
resisted calls to break±up the largest banks and many banks have responded to this opportunity by 
continuing to grow. This is partly because a post±crisis flight±to±safety has increased the market share 
of the largest banks. It is also because, even with the introduction of higher capital buffers, it still pays 
banks to grow their balance sheets in a situation in which market investors believe, reasonably, that the 
state will not allow the largest banks to fail, and so are prepared to lend to the largest banks at a lower 
interest rate. Haldane (2012) estimates that this de facto state subsidy is worth more than $700bn for 
the largest banks collectively. 
Figure 7 shows the real (inflation±adjusted) value of bank assets in 2015 as a percentage of 
their assets in 2005.5 It shows that 13 of the major banks in our sample had grown by 2015, with overall 
bank assets rising to 110% of their 2005 level. Those banks which have significantly reduced the size 
                                                          
5
 In the UK, the real, that is inflation-adjusted, value of £1 of assets in 2005 at 2015 prices would be 
,QWKH86RIDVVHWVLQZRXOGKDYHEHHQZRUWKLQSULFHV,QWKH(XUR]RQH¼
of assets in 2005 bHZRUWK¼LQSULFHV 
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of their trading exposures, UBS, Credit Suisse, Deutsche and RBS, have also significantly contracted 
their balance sheets. On the other hand, Wells Fargo, JP Morgan Chase, HSBC and Standard Chartered, 
banks which performed relatively well during the crisis, have grown significantly. By 2015, Wells 
Fargo held over $1,781bn in recorded balance sheet assets, over 300% of the inflation±adjusted value 
of its assets in 2005. Standard Chartered saw the value of its assets rise by 221%, whilst by 2015, JP 
Morgan¶VDVVHWVKDGLQFUHDVHGE\%. As the President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
DUJXHVµ7KHELJJHVWEDQNVDUHVWLOOWoo big to fail and continue to pose a significant, ongoing risk to our 
HFRQRP\¶.DVKNDUL 
 
Figure 7 2015 Assets as a % of 2005 Assets. 
 
 
Profits and Return on Equity: 
Most banks, however, have struggled to record significant profits in a market environment which, as 
we have noted, remains extremely challenging. One standard measure of profitability is return±on±
equity (ROE). In 2005, across our sample of banks, average ROE was 16.4%. At Goldman Sachs and 
Wells Fargo, ROE was over 19%. At Citigroup, it was 22% and at UBS a staggering 32%. By 2015, 
average (ROE) had fallen dramatically to just 5.3%, less than a third of returns in 2005. As a rule of 
thumb, the cost of capital in the banking sector is estimated to be around 10% (Morel et al. 2017: 7; 
Braithwaite and Alloway 2012). This implies that any bank which is earning a return on equity of less 
than 10% is performing at a less than break±even level and that its business model is failing. In 2005, 
amidst the boom, only two banks, JP Morgan (8.06%) and Unicredit (6.9%), failed to meet this target: 
ZLWKH[HFXWLYHVDW-30RUJDQUHFHLYLQJLQWKHLURZQZRUGVDµZRUOGRIVKLW¶IURPLQYHVWRUVIRUWKHLU
poor (read cautious) performance (McDonald 2009, 214; Bell and Hindmoor 2015). In 2015, on the 
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other hand, and as Figure 8 shows, only four banks, Wells Fargo (12.2%), Nordea (12%), UBS (11.3%) 
and JP Morgan (10.2%), met the 10% target, whilst the Royal Bank of Scotland, Standard Chartered, 
Credit Suisse and Deutsche Bank recorded negative returns. It is difficult to see, in this environment, 
and even in the absence of another exogenous shock, how many banks can continue to function on their 
current scale or with their current business models. 
 
Figure 8 Average Return on Equity, 2015. 
 
  
Equity markets have, unsurprisingly, reacted negatively to falling ROE, leading to a sustained fall in 
share prices. Figure 9 shows bank share prices at the end of 2015 as a % of their end±of±year 2005 
price. On average, bank share prices are 63% of the level they were in 2005, although this figure is 
skewed somewhat by the strong performance of a few banks at the top. In 2015, for example, JP 
0RUJDQ¶VVKDUHSULFHZDVRILWVOHYHOHowever, if we look at the bottom 16 banks in our 
sample of 21, we find banks running with equity prices at only 38% of the level they were in 2005: with 
the share price of RBS, Unicredit and Citigroup less than 20% of their 2005 levels. Only 5 banks in our 
sample had share prices in 2015 that exceeded their 2005 level. 
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Figure 9 2015 Share Price as % of 2005 Share Price. 
 
 
Standard regulatory approaches place little value on bank equity prices and market valuations in 
assessing banking risk. Yet as Haldane and Madouros (2012) argue, the standard regulatory focus on 
bank capital levels is a poor predictor of bank vulnerabilities and failure. They point out that a simple 
market measure of risk (the market value of bank equity relative to unweighted assets) is ten times better 
at predicting bank failures that the standard Basel III focus on Tier I capital. Sarin and Summers (2016) 
explore the implications of this insight about market valuations as a guide to bank risk and examine the 
reaction of equity markets and other financial indicators for a sample of large US and international 
banks. Contrary to expectations that more capital and liquidity would sooth equity markets, they find 
instead more market volatility and weakened equity values. Most centrally, Sarin and Summers (2016) 
focus on price to book value ratios that measure the market value of equity relative to the book value 
recorded on bank balance sheets. They show that, notwithstanding increases in the recorded book value 
of capital, the value of capital as assessed by markets has decreased substantially. The market value of 
bank capital relative to assets has also fallen substantially since the crisis. As the BIS (2016: 104) notes, 
µPrice±based indicators highlight that bank equity valuations of many advanced economy banks, in 
SDUWLFXODUKDYH\HWWRUHFRYHUIURPWKHLUFROODSVHGXULQJWKH*UHDW)LQDQFLDO&ULVLV¶Hence, rather than 
being better capitalised, bank capital on a market valuation basis is, in fact, weaker than prior to the 
crisis, implying a greater reliance on leverage. As the IMF (2016: 36) SRLQWVRXWµbanks with the lowest 
returns on assets also have a large discount to book value, pointing to business model challenges¶
$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH %,6   SDUW RI WKH UHDVRQ IRU HTXLW\ PDUNHW VNHSWLFLVP µUHIOHFWV WKH
macroeconomic outlook and unresolved NPL [non±performing loans@ SUREOHPV LQ VRPHFRXQWULHV¶ 
Sarin and Summers (2016) argue that because of tougher regulation and poor market conditions, equity 
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markets see more risk and weaker future returns in banking and that this has seriously undermined the 
µIUDQFKLVHYDOXH¶RIWKHPDMRUEDQNV7KH\WKHUHIRUHVHH 
little basis for supposing that the risks of major institutions becoming insolvent are 
substantially lower than they were before the crisis. Measured at market value, equity 
buffers are smaller even than they were even in the early part of the last decade (2016: 
103)  
In other words, and stepping back, whilst, as we saw in the first part of this paper, the capital and 
liquidity levels recorded on bank balance sheets are now higher than they were prior to the 2008 crisis, 
low profits and returns on equity have actually undermined capital buffers and re±emerged as a 
significant source of systemic financial risk. In this respect, the panic in share markets in early 2016 
ZKLFKVKDWWHUHG'HXWVFKH%DQN¶VVKDUHSULFHDQGGDPDJHGDPRQJVWRWKHUV%DUFOD\V8%6DQGSociété 
Générale, might be a harbinger of future troubles (Elliot and Treanor 2016). This episode centred not 
upon financial trading or the costs of regulation, but upon fears of reduced growth forecasts and weak 
banking returns (Treanor 2016). As the IMF (2016: 31±32) has warned, low levels of return within the 
EDQNLQJLQGXVWU\LPSDLUWKHDELOLW\RILQGLYLGXDOEDQNVWRVHFXUHHTXLW\IXQGLQJZKLFKµFRXOGZRUNto 
erode bank soundnesVDQGLQFUHDVHV\VWHPLFULVN¶ 
 A similar picture of risk emerges in market valuations in the markets that insure against bank 
defaults, the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market. If banks are less likely to fail, their CDS spreads 
should be lower, but in fact they are now much higher, suggesting that markets remain sceptical of 
reduced risk in the banking system (Sarin and Summers 2016: 78). Bankers have thus been exposed to 
powerful structural shifts in the form of pressures from the markets and the economy. The overall 
weakness in bank balance sheets and the risk assessments now being imposed by equity and CDS 
markets suggests that systemic risk remains a significant threat.  
 In this respect, a number of European banks are of particular concern. Regulatory activism has 
been more pronounced in the US and UK than in Europe. The largest Eurozone banks have been 
buffeted by particularly intense structural pressures as well, especially weak macroeconomic conditions 
and more recently the European debt crisis, leaving excess banking capacity, high levels of non±
performing loans and weak profits. The excess capacity problem or what the IMF (2017: 32) calls 
µRYHUEDQNLQJ¶ in Europe, LQWHQVLILHV FRPSHWLWLRQ DQG GHFUHDVHV SURILWDELOLW\ ZLWK µWRR PDQ\ EDQNV
FKDVLQJWRRIHZSURILWDEOHDQGVRXQGOHQGLQJRSSRUWXQLWLHV¶The Eurozone banks have, on average, the 
highest absolute levels of leverage; the highest levels of dependence upon wholesale borrowing; 
amongst the highest levels of dependence upon non±interest sources of income; and (relative to the 
American banks but not the British banks) the lowest levels of profit and returns on equity. There are 
some exceptions to this general rule which are suggestive of the capacity of executives in at least a few 
banks to sometimes formulate effective growth strategies. The Swedish±based bank Nordea has, for 
example, posted high ROE returns even with its high levels of leverage and dependence upon wholesale 
funding. On the whole, however, the European banks are a troubled group. The IMF (2017: 29) warns 
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that a group of structurally weak European banks with over $8.5 trillion in assets (or about a third of 
European banking assets), even after a cyclical recovery, would be stuck with a return on equity of less 
than 8%, thus making them more vulnerable to a future downturn and hence increasing systemic risk. 
It is also concerning that overall leverage levels at Deutsche Bank and ING Bank in 2015 were higher 
than the average leverage level of all banks in 2005; that deposits and equity at Deutsche Bank and 
Société Générale are less than 40% of the value of their assets; that Société Générale continues to derive 
more than 60% of its income from non±interest sources; and that impaired loans are running at such a 
high level across a number of banks, especially at Unicredit Group. The IMF (2016: L[ZDUQVWKDWµD
more complete VROXWLRQ WR WKH (XURSHDQ EDQN¶V SUREOHPV FDQQRW EH IXUWKHU SRVWSRQHG¶ DUJXLQJ in 
particular WKDWµHOHYDWHGQRQ±SHUIRUPLQJORDQVQHHGWREHWDFNOHGXUJHQWO\¶DQGWKDWµH[FHVVFDSDFLW\
in  nthe euro area banking system will have to be addressed.¶ 
 
Institutional Incrementalism and the Reluctant Restructurers 
This leaves us with a puzzle. Given the scale of the 2008 crisis and subsequent banking weaknesses, 
why have governments and regulators remained largely focussed on narrower institutional reforms and 
given less attention to broader structural reforms in banking markets? The question is even more 
pertinent because governments in the past have adopted structural approaches. For example, as noted, 
the US reforms to banking in the 1930s targeted the nature of banking markets by radically reducing 
the size of banks, limiting market scale and activities, and adopting measures to reduce banking 
competition.  
 Instead of more ambitious structural approaches, Fioretos (2016) characterises post±crisis bank 
reform as µintense incrementalism¶. There are ideational reasons for this. A good deal of the discourse 
on banking safety has focussed in recent decades on bank capital. Given wafer±thin capital buffers prior 
to the crisis, as well as the perceived costs of bank bailouts after the crisis, strengthening capital buffers 
was an obvious policy target in the post±crisis period. There are also institutional reasons. The reforms 
have displayed a degree of institutional path±dependence, with the pre±existing institutional focus on 
bank balance sheets and bank capital extended and deepened; all supported by pre±existing Basel 
institutional arrangements and practices, including substantial international coordination and 
agreements.  
 There are also broader material and political reasons why the reform agenda has adopted a 
narrow institutional focus. Eichengreen (2015) argues that the very fact that national governments saved 
most of the largest banks in 2008 and kept the financial system afloat has reduced the long±term 
pressure upon politicians to undertake far±reaching regulatory reform. The scale and power of the 
banking and financial sector is now also massive and globally interconnected. Bell and Hindmoor 
(2017) have shown that regulators have been willing to confront the banks over issues such as bank 
capital. But reforming entire banking markets in a structural sense or scaling back the size of the sector 
is another level of magnitude in difficulty. A further problem which increases the structural power of 
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large banks and financial markets is that governments UHPDLQDOLJQHGZLWKWKHLQWHUHVWVRIµELJILQDQFH¶
especially in working to preserve large, complex financial sectors. Reform debates on both sides of the 
Atlantic have been peppered with caveats by government leaders that the reforms should not be allowed 
to undermine the strength or the competitiveness of domestic financial markets. One reason why is that 
heavily indebted governments have come to rely on banks and financial markets to support sovereign 
debt markets. Gabor (2016a; 2016b) argues that government and central bank reliance on embedded 
public±private networks of finance in areas such as repo markets, help explain resistance to regulation 
of government collateral in repo markets and why repo markets were exempted in Europe from new 
WD[DWLRQPHDVXUHV$V*DERUDFRQFOXGHVµ7KHHYROXWLRQRIWKH)6%UHJXODWRU\DJHQGDRQ
repo markets suggest that financial dominance bites hard for states¶ Government leaders also continue 
WR VXSSRUW WKH LGHD RI KDYLQJ µLQWHUQDWLRQDOO\ FRPSHWLWLYH¶ ILQDQFLDO V\VWHPV and some worry that 
reforms might destabilise fragile banks. Politicians in France, Germany and Japan have been 
particularly active in attempting to water down reforms efforts (Admati and Hellwig 2013: 193). As 
Rixen (2013: 20) argues, in a world of mobile capital: 
Regulation is hampered by intensive jurisdictional competition. Governments fear losing 
internationally mobile financial activity to competitor states. They are not able to solve 
collective action problems to curb or ease competition amongst each other because they are 
influenced, even captured, by domestic fiQDQFLDOLQWHUHVWJURXSV«6ubject to these different 
pressures, governments can only agree on incremental and ineffective reforms, which are 
symbolically potent enough to soothe popular concerns. 
Although governments and regulators have become more sceptical about banks and financial markets, 
they have not, for the most part, taken the next step and much questioned the value or structure of 
financial and banking systems as whole (although see Turner 2015). The UK 2012 White Paper on bank 
reform thus LQVLVWVRQWKHQHHGWRµHQKDQFHWKH8.¶VUHSXWDWLRQDVWKHZRUOG¶VOHDGLQJILQDQFLDOFHQWUH¶
SRLQWLQJRXWWKDWWKHµWKHILQDQFLDOVHUYLFHVVHFWRULVDQLPSRUWDQWSDUWRIWKH8.HFRQRP\HPSOR\LQJ
around 1.4 million people and, in 2010/11, contributing 63bn in tax (BIS 2012: 3). The key problem is 
that prevailing regulatory approaches do not address some of the main drivers of banking risk, which 
stem fundamentally from the structural characteristics of banking markets. 
 
Conclusion 
In important ways, the major global banks have changed their spots, especially compared to their 
general behaviour in the run up to the 2008 crisis. The main change is that they are currently far less 
focussed on leveraged financial trading and other forms of financial wizardry. The banks also face more 
stringent regulation. The regulatory onslaught has however not been the main source of change in the 
system. Instead, as we have argued, the banks are being influenced by powerful structural forces in 
banking and financial markets. Here, competitive pressures remain important, driving an endless search 
for yield. Structural change has further increased the size of the shadow banking sector with new forms 
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of emergent risk. The largest banks are now in most cases larger, and are still too big and too 
interconnected to fail. Yet one key source of risk KDVFKDQJHGZLWKEDQNVQRZIDFLQJµWXQGUD OLNH¶
trading conditions where profits are scarce and equity market valuations are often extremely weak. This 
is a major source of vulnerability. The IMF (2016: ix) VHHVµZHDNEDQNSURILWDELOLW\«DVDORRPLQJ
ILQDQFLDOVWDELOLW\FKDOOHQJHIRUPDQ\DGYDQFHGHFRQRP\EDQNV¶Indeed, as we have seen, weak market 
valuations for bank capital have challenged the formal regulatory gains on this front. The new structural 
conditions leave many banks scrambling for profits and market share, potentially tempted by new forms 
of risk taking, and certainly more vulnerable to a downturn. 
The implication for policy is for more active steps in structuring banking markets to reduce 
excessive competitive pressures, as in US banking reform during the 1930s. Steps to encourage bank 
rationalisation in overbanked markets and more action in dealing with the too big and too complex to 
fail problems are also suggested. The problem, however, is that governments and regulators remain 
focussed on narrower institutional dimensions of banking behaviour and seem unwilling or unable to 
embrace wider structural reforms. 
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